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A NORMATIVE MODEL FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO
UNITED STATES LAW*
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of increasing globalization in which interna-
tional law, previously the domain of States and sovereigns, increas-
ingly affects us in our daily lives. As the nations of the world seem to
rush headlong toward internationalization of law, integration of mar-
kets, and centralization of government, it is necessary at times to take
a step back and examine the goals and consequences of this seemingly
unstoppable movement.  It is with this aim that this Note will attempt
to examine the recent debate regarding customary international law
and its integration into U. S. law between Professors Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith on one side, and Professor Harold Koh on the
other.  After reviewing the positions of both sides in this debate, this
Note will then present a constructive compromise, embodying the
most positive elements from the various arguments to remedy the ap-
parent flaws in both positions.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before entering this debate, however, a preliminary explanation
of customary international law is due.  Customary international law is
one of the two primary sources of international law which, along with
treaties, makes up the bulk of international law rules.1  Unlike trea-
ties, which are contractual in nature and generally written instru-
Copyright © 2001 by Daniel H. Joyner.
* The author wishes to thank Professors Michael Byers and H. Jefferson Powell for help-
ful comments and suggestions on drafts of this Note.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 101-102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].  In § 102 of the Restatement
are listed as a source of international law, in addition to treaties and customary international
law, laws deriving from “general principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”
However, in comment l such general principles of law are identified as a “secondary source” of
international law, and thus not ranked on par with treaties and customary international law.
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ments, customary international law is composed of two elements:
State practice and opinio juris, or the sense of legal obligation under
which a State acts.2  Through analysis of these two elements, as well as
their duration and character, rules of customary international law
eventually develop and gain acceptance by the international commu-
nity as binding law.3  Traditionally, customary international law has
covered areas of international law such as the laws pertaining to terri-
tory, immunities, the law of the sea, and the use of force by one State
against another.4  Customary international law is often later codified
by treaty.5
With the increasing modern development of certain areas of in-
ternational law, including international human rights law, customary
international law has come to cover many areas of the law that it his-
torically did not.6  Such human rights principles that have attained the
status of customary international law include prohibitions on slavery
and torture.7  However, due to the evolutionary process of the crea-
tion of customary international law and the subjective nature of its
recognition, there are other more controversial principles which are
argued also to have attained customary international law status.
These principles include prohibitions of some uses of the death pen-
alty,8 of discrimination based on sexual orientation,9 and of “the advo-
cacy of national, racial or religious hatred.”10  As is evident from these
examples, modern human rights law—and thus customary interna-
tional law—seeks to govern not only the relationships between States,
2. See generally id. § 102 (2), cmts. (b) & (c).
3. See id.
4. See generally D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed.
1998).
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 cmt. (i).
6. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 818 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position].
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 702.
8. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, GENERAL COMMENT ADOPTED
BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER ARTICLE 40, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, General Comment No. 24(52)
at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter UN COMMITTEE].
9. See David A. Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Sodomy Laws:
A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals Based on Customary International
Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 315-18 (1994); James D. Wilets, International Human Rights
Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 119 (1994).
10. UN COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 3.
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but also the relationship between a State and its citizens and the rela-
tionships of citizens one to another.11
In the United States, international human rights law has been
applied in federal courts largely under the auspices of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), which establishes federal jurisdiction for “any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”12  Thus, as interpreted by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,13 the ATS
grants federal question jurisdiction under federal common law for
claims under the Act arising from breaches of customary interna-
tional law.14  In holding that customary international law was part of
federal common law, the court established the ATS as constitutional
in granting jurisdiction under one of the established jurisdictional
categories of Article III of the Constitution.15  Thus, claims based on
customary international law could satisfy federal court jurisdiction
and be decided as a matter of federal common law.
III. THE CURRENT DEBATE
In February of 1997, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith pub-
lished a very significant article entitled Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position. The
“modern position,” as they termed it, at the basis of their critique was
the aforementioned widely accepted rule that customary international
law is part of federal common law in U.S. courts16that rules of cus-
tomary international law may be applied by U.S. federal courts with-
out prior political branch enactment.17  The article critiqued the
“modern position” and its foundations from the standpoints of his-
tory, case law, and policy, outlining several potentially dangerous
consequences resulting from the inclusion of customary international
law in federal common law.  The thrust of their proposal for the inte-
gration of customary international law into U.S. domestic law was as
follows: customary international law is not federal law unless enacted
11. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 818.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  See JOHN M. ROGERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED
STATES LAW 113-123 (1999) for a discussion of the ATS.
13. See 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 832-33.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 816-17.
17. See id. at 820.
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as such by the federal political branches.18  Thus “federal court inter-
pretations of [customary international law] would not be binding on
the federal political branches or the states.”19  The states can enact
customary international law into their state law and interpret it in
their courts, and the federal courts are obliged to follow the state’s in-
terpretation of customary international law on issues where no other
federal law is on point.20
It is this last issue of the states’ role in enacting and interpreting
rules of customary international law which seems most to have per-
plexed Professor Koh, who in May of 1998 responded to Bradley and
Goldsmith’s arguments with an article entitled Is International Law
Really State Law?21  In his article, Professor Koh defended what he
called the “hornbook rule” that customary international law is federal
common law in U.S. courts,22 and criticized the “bizarre suggestion”
that states could interpret and apply rules of international law and
thereby bind the federal courts by their interpretation.23  He argues
that the Supreme Court has “routinely held that a ‘few areas, involv-
ing ‘uniquely federal interests,’ are so committed by the Constitution
and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-
empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content
prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts.’”24  He
adds that “[t]he Court has specifically found such a ‘distinctive federal
interest in’ the exterior relation of this whole nation with other na-
tions and governments.”25  His interpretation of this doctrine is that
“even after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain legitimate
authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international
law into federal common law.”26
Bradley and Goldsmith responded to Koh in June of 1998 with a
short article in which they contested Koh’s characterization of their
18. See id. at 870.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824 (1998).
22. Id. at 1824.
23. Id. at 1850.
24. Id. at 1834 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citation
omitted)).
25. Id. at 1834-35 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508 (1988) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941)) (quoting Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259, 273 (1876))), (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 1835.
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arguments as proposing that customary international law was state
law.27  Their restated position, however, did not seem totally to sup-
port this denial: “our view is that [customary international law]
should not be a source of law for courts in the United States unless
the appropriate sovereign—the federal political branches or the ap-
propriate state entity—makes it so.”28  Though correct in pointing out
the fault in the exaggerative language of Koh’s title, Bradley and
Goldsmith’s proposal nevertheless included a substantial role for
states in the integration of customary international law into U.S. do-
mestic law.
At the heart of this debate seem to be fundamental disagree-
ments on at least two issues regarding how customary international
law becomes part of U.S. law.  The first has to do with the role of the
states in that process.  Bradley and Goldsmith conceive of a dual sys-
tem of authorization—one in which federal and state governments
may enact rules originating in customary international law into their
respective law.29  To support this assertion, they point to the history of
the application of customary international law in U.S. courts.  They
cite the use of customary international law as general common law,
applied by both federal and state courts in their respective jurisdic-
tions in the pre-Erie period.30  After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins31 and the annulment of federal courts’
ability to make rules of general common law, Bradley and Goldsmith
argue that “for several decades . . . it remained an open (and gener-
ally unaddressed) question whether [customary international law] was
part of this new federal common law.”32  They critique the rise of the
“modern position” through such later developments as the Supreme
Court decision in Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,33 the Second
Circuit decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,34 and the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations35 as a combination of “mistaken inter-
27. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal
Courts].
28. Id. at 2260 (emphasis added).
29. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 870.
30. See id.  at 822-24.
31. See Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 821.
33. See 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
34. See 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1.
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pretations of history, doctrinal bootstrapping . . . and academic fiat.”36
They see exclusive federal control over the integration of customary
international law into U.S. law as unnecessary, arguing that propo-
nents of that position have not shown any recent examples of federal
and state governments being at odds over discrete issues of interna-
tional law.  “In fact states rarely consider issues of [customary inter-
national law], and when they do, they tend to adopt a very deferential
attitude toward the federal government’s views.”37  Thus, they see ex-
clusive federal control over the integration of customary international
law, such as through its inclusion in federal common law, as an un-
necessary evolution which “portends a dramatic transfer of constitu-
tional authority from the states to the world community and to the
federal judiciary.”38
In response to this assertion, Koh traces the development of fed-
eral control over foreign affairs from much earlier origins.39  He cites
case law supporting federal foreign affairs dominance beginning in
force with Supreme Court cases in the 1930’s that “suggested that the
federal power over foreign affairs never derived from the states. . .
that power vested directly ‘in the federal government as necessary
concomitants of nationality,’” 40 and held that “in respect of our for-
eign relations generally, state lines disappear.”41  Koh then cites as
seminal the Supreme Court’s 1964 ruling in Sabbatino42 which, con-
trary to Bradley and Goldsmith’s “serious misreading”43 of the case,
“acknowledged the supremacy of not only Congress and the Presi-
dent, but also federal judges’ making common law rules in the area of
external relations.”44
Koh is also dubious of Bradley and Goldsmith’s assertion that
federal control over customary international law integration is unnec-
essary and that states would rarely be at variance with the federal
government on questions of customary international law.45  He asserts
that the problems caused by diverse and balkanized interpretations of
such laws among the fifty states would lead to confusion on issues
36. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 821.
37. Id. at 871.
38. Id. at 846.
39. See Koh, Is International  Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1846 n.121, 1841.
40. Id. at 1846-47 (quoting U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
41. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)).
42. See 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
43. Koh, Is International  Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1830.
44. Id. at 1847.
45. See id. at 1851-52.
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ranging from transnational business dealing to treatment of foreign
heads of State.46  Koh argues that the Bradley and Goldsmith pro-
posal would, for example, “allow Massachusetts to deny the custom-
ary international law protection of head-of-state immunity to Queen
Elizabeth on tort claims arising out of events in Northern Ireland,
whereas the forty-nine other states could choose instead to grant the
Queen every conceivable variant of full or partial immunity.”47
The second issue at the heart of the current debate seems to be
the identification of the entity or entities best suited to fill the role of
conduit for the integration of customary international law into do-
mestic law.  Under Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal, all federal
authorizations of customary international law rules into U.S. domestic
law would have to be made by the federal political branches.48  They
would circumscribe the federal common law of U.S. courts so as to
exclude customary international law principles and leave to federal
courts the sole responsibility of interpreting federal political branch
enactments in this area.49  On the state level it seems that Bradley and
Goldsmith are prepared both to allow state legislatures to enact prin-
ciples of customary international law into state law, and to allow state
courts to bring customary international law principles into their juris-
prudence absent state legislative approval.50  State interpretations of
customary international law rules would then govern in federal court
diversity cases absent conflicting federal law.51  Thus, in a very real
way, states would be the first, and often final, authority in many cases
in determining which customary international law principles would
enter U.S. domestic law and how those principles should be inter-
preted.
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that state authority in domestic re-
ception of customary international law rules is not only justified his-
torically,52 but is also an important safeguard against federal power
over traditionally state-governed areas of the law.  They point out
that because the customary international law of human rights is ar-
guably more protective of individual rights in some cases than state
constitutions and statutes, federal judicial incorporation of such laws
46. See id. at 1841, 1850-51.
47. Id. at 1829 (footnote omitted).
48. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 870.
49. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 27, at 2260.
50. See id.; Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 870.
51. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 870.
52. See supra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text.
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could, for example, prohibit the application of some state death pen-
alty statutes.53  They contend that such abrogation of state law by cus-
tomary international law rules could extend to matters “ranging from
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the extraterritorial
application of state law, including state tax law.”54
Professor Koh’s position begins with the proposition that foreign
relations is the exclusive domain of the federal government.55  In sup-
port of his position, he cites concerns as early as those of Alexander
Hamilton regarding the possibility that the United States, which at
the time was in its vulnerable infancy as a nation, could be the subject
of military reprisal due to the errant ruling of a state court on an issue
of international law.56  He points out Hamilton’s consequent division
of “cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and those
which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law,”57 with
“[t]he former . . . supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the lat-
ter for that of the [s]tates.”58  Koh argues that issues arising from cus-
tomary international law, such as head of state immunity, in which it
is necessary for the nation to have one voice, “raise precisely the kind
of ‘basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judici-
ary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community’ that the Supreme
Court held ‘must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.’”59
Koh examines Supreme Court cases such as Sabbatino60 and
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.61 and determines that it is not only
appropriate but a settled principle of law that foreign affairs, and thus
the incorporation of customary international law into U.S. law, pres-
ents an area of “‘uniquely federal interest[].’” 62  Such integration is
thereby “committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States
to federal control,” with the effect that “state law is pre-empted and
53. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 846-47.
54. Id. at 847.
55. See Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1834-35.
56. See id. at 1841.
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
58. Id.
59. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1829 (quoting Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)).
60. See 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
61. See 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
62. Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? supra note 21, at 1834 (quoting Boyle v.
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citation omitted)).
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replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed . . .
by the courts—so-called ‘federal common law.’”63
Thus, in Koh’s view, when the political branches have not di-
rectly spoken to an issue of customary international law, the federal
courts retain the authority to incorporate those rules into federal
common law and use them as the basis for decision in federal cases.64
This authority, he asserts, derives not only from a federal interest in
foreign relations, but from the grant of power in the Constitution, Ar-
ticle 1 Section 8, to “define and punish”65 breaches of international
law, as well as from other constitutional grants and federal statutes.66
Thus, federal courts may interpret rules of customary international
law with the force of federal law, binding upon the states.67
IV.  A NORMATIVE MODEL
A. Theoretical Underpinnings
This Note will attempt to fashion a compromise of sorts between
the two positions summarized above on both the issue of the role of
states in the integration of customary international law into U.S. law
and the issue of the entity or entities properly authorized to bring
about that integration.  Before doing so, it will be helpful to examine
and take sides in yet another international law debate—that of the
monists versus the dualists.  While at first seemingly removed from
the current issue under examination, this latter debate is actually at
the very heart of the question of the integration of customary interna-
tional law into U.S. law, or into any nation’s law for that matter.  It is
a debate, the outcome of which is important in determining what role
nations play in the international legal order now and in the future.
Monists believe that national law (domestic law) and interna-
tional law are both part of the same legal system.68  In one influential
monist model, domestic law is seen as secondary in rank within that
single system to international law, and indeed derives its validity from
63. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
64. See Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 22,  at 1835.
65. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
66. See Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1835.
67. See id. at 1825, 1846.
68. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 141 (2d ed.
1987); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1106 n.7 (1990).  See generally HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-88 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966).
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it.69  Thus, international law is not subject to domestic law limitations,
including those in national constitutions, but rather reaches into the
domestic legal system even without formal enactment by national
lawmaking bodies.70  Under the monist conception of legal order, sub-
stantial control over fundamental areas of domestic law is transferred
to international law and international law-making.71
Dualists, however, see domestic law and international law as two
distinct legal systems, existing in two separate spheres of influence.72
For there to be exchange between these two systems certain proce-
dures must be followed.  For international law rules to be used by
domestic courts, the international laws in question must first be for-
mally “transformed” into the domestic legal system by the proper
domestic legal authorities.73  This aspect carries with it the further ef-
fect that international law rules so transformed into domestic law are
by that process made subject to constitutional constraints which are
placed on any other domestic laws so enacted.74
As applied in world legal systems, these doctrines have been
variously accepted and modified by nations and used as a basis for the
integration of international law rules into their respective domestic
legal systems.75  As is readily apparent, determining which conception
and what variation thereof should be accepted by a particular nation
is vital to understanding how that nation should receive international
law principles into its legal order.
This Note supports a variation of the dualist conception of world
legal order.  Doing so accepts and reinforces the sovereignty of the
nations of the world as independent personalities which, though the
makers of international law, retain independent sovereignty over
their own domestic law.  This conclusion also seems eminently more
reasonable in light of the present evolutionary stage of world legal,
political, social, and cultural divergence and the formidable barriers
69. See Kelsen, supra note 68, at 553.
70. See id.
71. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
72. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 140.  See generally Jonathan Turley, Dualistic
Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993); J.G. Starke,
Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 66; J.G. Col-
lier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 924, 925
(1989) (“Dualism is associated with positivist theories and with the notion that States, not indi-
viduals, are the primary subjects of international law.”).
73. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 140.
74. See id.
75. See generally id. at 141-48.
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presented thereby to a seamless, unified legal order encompassing all
nations of the world.
It is important not to mistake such a position supporting a dualis-
tic legal system for one that necessarily eschews or opposes interna-
tional law generally.  Rather, it is a position that seeks to provide a
world legal structure in which the proper domain of international law
is established and regulated by powers of national sovereignty and
autonomy.  These powers, while necessarily compromised to a degree
by the very fact of an international legal system, should not be so
compromised as to relinquish necessary national control over areas of
domestic lawmaking most suited for and most fundamentally the in-
terest of national political bodies.
Thus accepting as a premise the dualist conception of interna-
tional law and the necessity of domestic procedures to bring interna-
tional law principles into domestic law, it remains to be examined
how these domestic procedures and authorities may be organized so
as best to fit within the framework of this conception in the context of
the integration of customary international law into U.S. law.
B. The Role of the States
As to the issue of the role of the states in the integration of cus-
tomary international law, this Note supports the preliminary position
of Professor Koh that acceptance of customary international law rules
is intrinsically tied to the foreign relations of the United States and
should thus be treated exclusively as a question of federal law.76  In
support of this position, further evidence can be mustered of constitu-
tional intent from its framers, such as the observation of John Jay that
“under the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense,
and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the
same points and questions, in thirteen States . . . will not always ac-
cord or be consistent.”77  Also compelling is James Madison’s admoni-
tion that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought
to be in respect to other nations.”78  This support of the federalization
of foreign relations matters is demonstrated further by Supreme
Court jurisprudence establishing soundly that “[p]ower over external
affairs is not shared by the [s]tates; it is vested in the national gov-
76. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 15 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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ernment exclusively”79 and that “[o]ur system of government is such
that the interest of the cities, counties, and states, no less than the in-
terest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that
federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely
free from local interference.”80
Questions of customary international law interpretation have
enormous potential for raising issues of the relations of the United
States with other nations.  This potential has been demonstrated most
poignantly by the concern, historically realized, of national responsi-
bility rising out of state government interpretation and application of
rules of international law.81  Indeed, such potential was foreseen by
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 80:
[t]he union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members.  And the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.  As
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts . . . is
with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which
the citizens of other countries are concerned.82
An example of such a case of national responsibility potentially
arising from erroneous state court ruling is the prosecution of Alex-
ander McLeod, a Canadian citizen, in 1840 by the state of New York
for murder and arson rising from his participation in the sinking of
the steamer Caroline.83  Great Britain contested the basis of his prose-
cution, asserting rules of international law protecting public officials
acting in obedience of higher orders.84  In connection with this case,
some enlightening correspondence was carried out between Ameri-
79. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
80. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
81. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.
10, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/51/10/ (1996), reprinted in D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 499 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that “[t]he conduct of an organ of a territorial
governmental entity within a State shall also be considered as an act of that State under interna-
tional law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question”); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (stating that
“[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to per-
form a treaty”).
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
83. See People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1841); see generally David J.
Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American Writ
of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515 (1992).
84. See Bederman, supra note 83, at 518; Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Po-
sition, supra note 6, at n.56.
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can and British officials.  One such communication, written by Secre-
tary of State Daniel Webster, maintained that although the U.S. gov-
ernment agreed with the British arguments pursuant to international
law, the U.S. government had no power to intervene in the proceed-
ing of a state criminal prosecution.85  This denial of federal authority
provoked a strong reaction from the British minister to Washington,
who had earlier remarked
[w]ith the particulars of the internal compact which may exist be-
tween the several States which compose the Union, Foreign Powers
have nothing to do; the Relations of Foreign Powers are with the
aggregate Union . . . . Therefore when a Foreign Power has redress
to demand for a wrong done to it by any State of the Union, it is to
the Federal Government, and not the separate State, that such
Power must look for redress for that wrong.  And such Foreign
Power cannot admit the plea that the separate State is an inde-
pendent Body over which the Federal Government has no control.86
Although disclaiming the authority to correct a state court ruling,
Webster nevertheless recognized U.S. responsibility for consequent
violations of international law.87  In a letter to Joshua Spencer, the
U.S. District Attorney representing McLeod, Webster stated that
[t]he care of the foreign relations of this country is confided to the
Government of the United States . . . and that government is re-
sponsible if anything occur, which it could prevent, furnishing just
ground of complaint to other nations . . . . If the pacific relations
now subsisting between the United States and England should be
disturbed, by the proceedings in the case of McLeod, the conse-
quences are to fall, not on New York alone, but on the whole un-
ion.88
Included in Webster’s concerns of national responsibility for acts
of a state breaching international law, in addition to fears of war,
were surely well grounded fears of adverse effects to the fledgling
U.S. economy resulting from trade sanctions or other economic coun-
termeasures imposed by Great Britain, the economic superpower of
the time, in response to such a violation.89  In modern terms, the eco-
85. See Bederman, supra note 83, at 519-20.
86. Letter from Mr. Fox to Mr. Webster (March 12, 1841), in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843, at 43 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et al. eds., 1983).
87. See Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Spencer (August 6, 1841), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
DANIEL WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843, at 101 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et al. eds.,
1983); Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (September 20, 1841), in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843, at 145 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et al. eds., 1983).
88. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Spencer (August 6, 1841), supra note 87.
89. See generally Charles M. Wiltse, Foreword to 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER,
DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker et al. eds., 1983) at viii (discussing
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nomic price for violations of international law attributable to national
governments also includes sometimes significant monetary damages
awarded in suits before international tribunals.90
Interestingly, the desire of the founding fathers to have fed-
eral government control over interpretations of international law is a
point conceded by Bradley and Goldsmith.91  They argue that even
with state authority to interpret and apply customary international
law rules in their jurisdictions, effective federal control over the proc-
ess would remain.92  They point to two constitutional powers granted
the federal government: the authorization granted Congress and the
President to incorporate customary international law into federal
statutes and treaties, and Congress’ power to make federal jurisdic-
tion exclusive in areas to which federal subject matter jurisdiction at-
taches.93
However, while there is certainly a role for the federal political
branches to play in controlling customary international law integra-
tion, as will be discussed later in this Note, without exclusive federal
authority over this area of law an expectation of federal control rising
from political branch legislative power is unrealistic.  Limiting to fed-
eral court jurisdiction those areas of the law to which federal subject
matter jurisdiction extends would not subsume all questions which
might arise from a breach of customary international law and end up
in the courts, and would therefore not provide this exclusivity.   Con-
sider, for example, that a case is brought against a state by resident
parents of a youth convicted of murder, alleging that the state, in
violation of a rule of customary international law forbidding the exe-
cution of children, is planning to execute their son pursuant to a
properly enacted, arguably constitutional, state law.  This case, being
strictly between a state and its citizens, and presenting a question of
state law, would nowhere arise under any area qualifying for subject
matter jurisdiction in federal court.  Thus, even if these subject matter
areas were exclusive, it would not stop this case, or others like it, from
Webster’s interest in international trade and economic matters and his zealous efforts while
Secretary of State to “extend and enlarge the international trade that constituted for him the
sinews of national prosperity”).
90. See John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and
Resolving the Stalemate, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 65, 89-90, n.224 (1995) (noting that
compound interest is awardable as part of damage awards in some suits before international
tribunals, specifically in cases of expropriation).
91. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 824-25.
92. See id. at 825-26.
93. See id.
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being decided and, absent some other power of federal oversight and
alteration of the state court decision, would allow the state supreme
court the final say on a matter of customary international law inter-
pretation.
The most prudent solution, and the most warranted historically
and doctrinally, would thus seem to be exclusive federal control over
the integration of customary international law into U.S. law.  It is only
through exclusive federal authority over this integration that the na-
tion can, as it must, speak truly in one voice concerning these inter-
pretations which, as demonstrated, have the potential for profound
impact on U.S. foreign relations.  Through such federal control, fears
of national responsibility rising from erroneous state interpretations
of international law can be ameliorated and the entity and its full con-
stituency who will bear the burden of any such adverse decision will
have more direct control over, and representation in, its handling.
Unless this authority is exclusive, there would, under any con-
figuration of such state authority—even if subject to federal political
branch supervision—rest a heavy onus of responsibility on the federal
government to police the varying state court interpretations of cus-
tomary international law.94  This responsibility, in addition to being a
costly use of scarce government resources, is in the end an unneces-
sary expenditure in a system with other safeguards of traditional state
prerogatives.  Such concerns, as voiced by Bradley and Goldsmith in
support of the states’ role in integration,95 can be substantially elimi-
nated in a system in which the federal political branches are the ex-
clusive conduit of customary international law rules.  It is this second
issue in the current debate to which consideration now turns.
C. Political Branch Control
The second prong of Koh’s argument, namely that customary in-
ternational law may be implemented or “transformed” into U.S. law
by federal courts in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, is
more problematic.96  It does not follow that because customary inter-
national law integration should be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law, therefore the federal courts should have power by federal
common law to incorporate such principles into U.S. law in the ab-
94. See Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1852.
95. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
JOYNER.DOC 04/04/01  3:09 PM
148 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:133
sence of political branch authorization.  Conversely, sound arguments
both in constitutional principle and policy oppose that logical leap.
Firstly, this argument disregards the fact that there is a constitu-
tional system already in place expressly for the purpose of handling
questions of the integration of international law into domestically en-
forceable U.S. law.  The relevant sections are found, importantly, in
Articles I and II—the articles addressing powers of the legislative and
executive branches.97  There is no relevant power spoken of in Article
III.98  In fact, cases arising under the “law of nations” are conspicu-
ously absent from Section 2 of Article III, which lists those subject ar-
eas of law to which “the judicial power shall extend.”99
The constitutional system of integration includes references to
both major sources of international law—treaties and customary in-
ternational law.100  Treaties and their integration into U.S. law are ad-
dressed in Article II, which provides that the President “shall have
Power, by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
treaties.”101  Only after the political branches have so acted and have
brought the principles embodied in the treaty into domestically en-
forceable U.S. law does the judiciary have the power, under Article
III, to adjudicate cases arising under such treaty.102
Similarly, the issue of integration of customary international law
is addressed in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution with the fol-
lowing grant of power: “The Congress shall have Power . . . to define
and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”103  Thus, the ex-
clusive power not only to punish offenses against the law of nations
(the ancestor in title of customary international law),104 but also to de-
fine those offenses, or rather to give them birth as cognizable U.S.
97. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-II.
98. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive
Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1222-23 (1988) (arguing that the drafters
of the Constitution intentionally did not include the law of nations within the “Laws of the
United States”); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 831-32 (1989).
100. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . . ”).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
104. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 819.
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law, is expressly given to Congress.105  Though this exclusivity has
been challenged,106 a textual reading of the Constitution itself seems
to endow only the Congress with this right of definition, concurrent
with its other lawmaking functions.107  Similar to the system for trea-
ties, only after Congress has defined those principles that will have
the force and effect of U.S. law does the judiciary have the authority,
under Article III, to adjudicate cases arising under such “Laws of the
United States.”108  Thus, in the constitutional system, congressional
enactment of the law of nations is to be treated no differently than
any other congressional legislative act, having the same force, grant-
ing judicial competence to adjudicate, and embodying all other at-
tributes and limitations of any other congressional legislation.
It is this feature of the constitutional system for integration of
customary international law that should put to rest fears concerning
the abrogation of state authority in areas of traditional state control.
In the constitutional system, congressional enactments of customary
international law carry with them the same limitations from elsewhere
in the Constitution as do any other federal statutes.  The most fun-
damental of these limitations, or protections of states’ rights, is the
doctrine of limited powers, or the inability of Congress to legislate
outside the sphere of its constitutionally granted prerogatives109—a
doctrine enforceable through judicial constitutional review.110  Thus,
in the constitutional system of integration of customary international
law, Congress can do nothing by application of international law prin-
ciples that it cannot do by any other legislation.  Therefore, areas of
traditional state control should remain as such, with no more federal
interference in state law than has historically occurred.
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  This power is, of course, exercised along with the
Presidential power of veto in Article I, Section 7.
106. See Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 21, at 1825.
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also supra note 98 concerning Presi-
dential veto power.
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
109. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and
defined.  Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”);
see also Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1033 (1953) (“If
the Congress is powerless to intervene in areas which have been reserved to the states, so too
are the federal courts.  The constitutional doctrine of limited powers is applicable to both
alike.”).
110. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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This constitutional system for the proper integration of custom-
ary international law is not purely theoretical.  There are multiple ex-
amples of Congress enacting several pieces of legislation punishing
offenses against the law of nations, thereby making those offenses
punishable under U.S. law.111  These examples are strictly in following
with the constitutional system of customary international law integra-
tion, in which international law principles do not become binding as
U.S. law until they are transformed from the sphere of international
law into national law.  Further, it is important to note that, as Bradley
and Goldsmith state, “Congress’ selective incorporation would be
largely superfluous if [customary international law] were already in-
corporated wholesale into federal common law, as advocates of the
modern position suggest.”112
Such political branch incorporation can and sometimes does
leave some room for judicial discretion and interpretation.  The Alien
Tort Statute, for example, creates a cause of action in which the sub-
stantive applicable law is “the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”113  However, such judicial discretion regarding applicable law
is limited to those laws that would be civilly actionable “by an alien
for a tort only.”114  Thus the area of customary international law or
treaty law is significantly limited to only those situations meeting cri-
teria of persons and type of action expressly delineated.  An example
of an even more specifically limited area of applicable law can be
found in an early congressional act prohibiting “the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations.”115  In these exemplary statutes, Con-
gress, acting in its authority under Article I of the Constitution, is de-
fining and making actionable “[o]ffenses against the Law of Na-
tions”116 while granting to the federal judges who must apply that law
some discretionary leeway in determining and interpreting exactly
which principles of treaty law or customary international law to apply.
Given the recent proliferation of international human rights law and
other international law principles that will potentially impact and be
integrated into domestic law,117 it would seem advisable for Congress
111. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 508
n.16 (2nd ed. 1996) (citing examples).
112. Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique of the Modern Position, supra note 6, at 857.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
114. Id.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
117. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
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to delineate and define with more clarity and detail than it has his-
torically which principles it desires to be applicable in U.S. law.118
However, the paradigm for political branch enactment of customary
international law into U.S. law and the delegation of delineated
authority, in varying degrees, to the federal courts who must apply it,
has been set from the time of the nation’s infancy.
Regarding the delegation of limited discretion to federal judges,
perhaps a helpful analog to guide in the application of this principle
could be found in principles of U.S. administrative law and the so-
called “Chevron doctrine,” arising from the highly influential case of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.119  Chevron announced a test for
determining whether or not an executive agency is within its statutory
grant of authority (contained in its enabling legislation) in creating
and applying administrative regulation.120  The two-step test first asks
whether Congress has expressly spoken to the issue in dispute.121  If
Congress has not, then the second step allows the agency a limited
amount of discretion in its rulemaking and application to which the
court would give a degree of deference.122  While analogous only to a
degree in the case of statutory grants of authority for judicial applica-
tion of customary international law, a similar system of examination
could be employed in such cases whereby, absent prior congressional
law on point, a federal court would be granted discretion within its
statutorily established bounds (set by the specific statute under which
the action is brought) to apply and interpret customary international
law principles.  The outer limits of this discretion could then be po-
liced by appeal, as with any other question of law, as well as by ulti-
mate reversal by legislation if it is deemed that the courts have abused
their granted discretion.  It is important to note that this system dif-
fers from the one espoused by Professor Koh in that such federal
court discretion would be bounded by specific statutory grants of
118. Perhaps the best example of a statute overly broad in its definition of an offense against
the law of nations is the aforementioned Alien Tort Statute, which makes actionable claims by
aliens for torts committed in breach of the law of nations, seemingly in its entirety, or a U.S.
treaty.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).  Such a large scope of potentially applicable law seems
overly broad and arguably not judicially manageable, in addition to giving the judiciary exces-
sive discretion in deciding which principles of law to apply and in what form.
119. See 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 466-71
(1993).
121. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
122. See id. at 843-44; AMAN, supra note 120.
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authority and not exercisable at all in the case of a complete lack of
statutory law on point.
Such a system would allow federal judges to exercise a degree of
authorized discretion, and would facilitate customary international
law integration through the political system by not requiring detailed
specificity in legislation.  By the same token, the system would make
institutional allowance for the dynamic character of customary inter-
national law, as discussed below, and would permit a degree of evolu-
tion in the substantive rules of customary international law.  The ef-
fect of this system would be to enhance significantly the ability of the
U.S. legal system to incorporate and apply desirable principles of cus-
tomary international law effectively, while retaining substantial con-
trol over which principles of customary international law to so incor-
porate in the political branches of the federal government—entities
constitutionally endowed with such authority.123
Secondly, the logical extension from federal control over cus-
tomary international law to its inclusion in federal common law is
controverted by policy arguments focusing on the nature of custom-
ary international law itself.  As previously noted, unlike treaties,
which are contractual, written instruments, customary international
law is a very dynamic source of international law.124  It is “created” by
the acts and intentions of States, and is thus in a relatively constant
state of flux, with the continual possibility of change from a variety of
sources.125  Indeed, the very terms by which such acts and intents are
analyzed, namely State practice and opinio juris, are definitionally
unsure and often very difficult to apply.126  Even when agreed on the
definition of its terms, nations are not the final arbiters of what is or is
not customary international law.  The only means, absent codification
by treaty, of concretely establishing rules of customary international
law is by the rendering of an opinion in an adjudication before an in-
ternational court.127  Since adjudication of international disputes is
123. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
126. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, discussion
note 2, 41 discussion note 4 (5th ed. 1998).
127. See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(i) (1945) (stating
that the I.C.J., the judicial arm of the United Nations, “whose function is to decide in accor-
dance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,” is to apply, among other
things, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”).  Thus the
I.C.J. applies the elements of customary international law to see if it is indeed present in the
facts presented to it, and then uses such divined rules as its basis of decision.  It is only through
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relatively rare,128 many averred principles of customary international
law have yet to be ruled upon by any such court.  Customary interna-
tional law rules thus suffer from ambiguity, as they often lack sure
existence and are interpretively unclear in many instances.
In addition, customary international law rules have the charac-
teristic of being one degree further removed from whatever validity
there is to representative participation in lawmaking at the national
level.  Analysis of State practice and opinio juris gives no weight to
expressed popular sentiment within a nation but focuses rather on the
actions and intent of the nation’s leaders.129  While it may be main-
tained that these leaders, elected in many cases by the citizenry of a
nation, do represent their interests, the representation in interna-
tional fora by a very few of those elected (and more often appointed)
officials constitutes a tenuous hold on principles of true representa-
tion of a nation’s citizens.
Moreover, in the making of customary international law by these
processes it is possible for a nation to become bound by rules of in-
ternational law to which its representatives did not consent, or even
tried to reject.130  By no stretch of reasoning can such rules be main-
tained as representative of the citizens of that nation.
The process of creating customary international law, while repre-
sentative on the international level as among States, is hardly so on
the individual level.  This fact becomes even more important when it
is remembered that customary international law rules, with the evolu-
tion of the international law of human rights, have come to affect
more and more the relationships between nations and their citizens
and between individuals—subjects in which representation of the in-
dividual in lawmaking is of manifest importance.131
Customary international law being so ambiguous and unrepre-
sentative, it is of fundamental importance that the political branches
this process in such tribunals that rules of customary international law can be given concrete
definition and force.
128. See HARRIS supra note 126, at 985 (“In international relations, most disputes are set-
tled through negotiation between the parties or by third party assistance in the form of good
offices, conciliation, or the conduct of fact finding-inquiries.”).
129. See id. at 25 n.2 (listing several forms of state practice, all consisting of official action).
130. Though it is possible in some cases for a state to object persistently to a rule of custom-
ary international law and thus not be subject to it, successful persistent objection is rare and can
be a high standard in terms of required action for a State to meet.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. d (1987); David A. Col-
son, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 957, 967 (1986).
131. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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of the federal government be the exclusive conduit of its integration
into domestic law.  First, for the sake of clarity of integrated custom-
ary international law rules, political branch enactment through statute
would guarantee a relatively clear statement of such law as it applies
to domestic contexts, or at least substantially limit and delineate
which areas of customary international law are to be considered and
under what circumstances they are to be applied in U.S. law.  Such
legislation would also provide guidance to the courts on how it should
be interpreted. This procedure would simplify and clarify the force
and effect of transformed international law principles and aid in
proper enforcement by domestic authorities.
Second, exclusive political branch authority would allow deci-
sions regarding which laws to adopt and in what form to rest substan-
tially with duly elected, representative officials of the national citi-
zenry and not with federal judges.  Surely few will argue that there
are no problems with the existing U.S. political system, or that the
legislative process is not vulnerable, or even prone to corruption from
various influences.  However, whatever the faults of that system, it is
decidedly more representative of the will of the majority of the na-
tion’s populace than are the views of unelected jurists whose very
status as life-tenure judicial authorities is derived from a desire to
make them politically insulated, un-answerable to the voice of the
people in their decisions.132  Such authorities are definitionally incom-
petent to act as lawmakers, representative of the best interests of the
nation as expressed through the will of its citizens.  Lawmaking gen-
erally, and especially in the case of laws which have such significant
effects on the foreign relations of the nation as well as potential inter-
nal effects on fundamental relationships between citizens and gov-
ernment, should be the province of the representatives of the people
as the principle of representation may be best realized.
Thus by both constitutional principle and policy, the authority of
federal judges to interpret and apply principles of customary interna-
tional law without prior legislative authorization is a doctrine which is
imprudent at best and a threat to American principles of democracy
at worst.  Conversely, the exclusive authority of the federal political
branches to transform and enact customary international law princi-
ples into domestic U.S. law is a doctrine sound in constitutional prin-
ciple and one which has effects of clarity and the realization of repre-
132. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the Constitution:
A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 685 (1999).
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sentative democracy in its processes that are lacking in the judicial in-
tegration model.
D. Summary and Effects of the Normative Model
By way of summary, then, this Note supports the proposition by
Professor Koh that customary international law integration into U.S.
domestic law should be an area exclusively within the competence of
the federal government.  It also supports the position of Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith that the federal political branches should be
the sole conduit for customary international law integration at the
federal level.  The cumulative effect of these assertions is, therefore,
to make the federal political branches the sole entities empowered to
transform customary international law principles into U.S. domestic
law.
This normative model, based on principle and fundamental doc-
trine, will have effects adverse to the wishes of some legal theorists,
perhaps especially to the wishes and goals of some proponents of in-
ternational human rights law.  Admittedly, it will be more difficult to
get some more revolutionary and sweeping human rights laws
through Congress than it would be to have those same principles
transformed into U.S. law through judicial decision.133 It will also, for
the same reason, limit the number of international law principles gen-
erally which have the force of law in the United States.
However, it is this very aspect of such a normative system which
will provide other observers of international law and relations with
some comfort and assurance that U.S domestic laws will not be sub-
verted by international actors with whom they share only some com-
mon interests—that domestic law will continue to be governed by na-
tional representation and values.  Indeed, such concerns are at the
heart of the dualist conception of world legal order.  A fundamentally
dualistic system, as the one proposed by this Note, allows for the
making of international law and for its efficacious application in the
international legal sphere, properly governing those entities which
had a proper hand in making it—namely the nations of the world in
their capacity as world citizens.  However, the system also preserves
133. This will of course depend on the court in which suit is brought.  It is an unfortunate
byproduct of judicial lawmaking that parties may, through forum shopping, pick those judges
which they think most sympathetic to their views.  Such forum shopping for sympathetic law-
makers is substantially limited if the lawmaking must take place within the single body of Con-
gress, theoretically representing proportionately the panoply of political positions within the
United States.
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to the individual nation the authority to take from the international
sphere those laws which it feels, according to its expert understanding
of its national values and goals, are best calculated to be in harmony
with the same, and integrate them into its domestic law.  This role of
filter or instrument of discernment is best filled by the representative
officials of the individual nations, and not through the osmotic proc-
ess of seeping in through its courts.
On balance, such a dualist understanding and application of the
role of national and international legal institutions has a more sub-
stantial foundation in the constitutional law of the United States.134
The system incorporates fundamentally important positive effects in
policy which make it, in the final analysis, a more prudent position for
U.S. adoption, and one more beneficial to the interests of the United
States and to the preservation of important aspects of its sovereignty
now and in the future, than the judicial integration model.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to reach a constructive compromise be-
tween the positions advanced in the recent debate over customary in-
ternational law integration into U.S. domestic law.  By so doing, it has
attempted to contribute, if modestly, to an area of law the effects of
which are only beginning to be felt by the nations and peoples of the
world.  Indeed, it is an area the importance of which few in the world
realize, but one which will increasingly affect their lives, and the lives
of their posterity over the coming decades and centuries.
It is hoped that a greater awareness of the importance and evolu-
tion of customary international law, and international law and institu-
tions generally, will lead to informed judgments as to the directions of
that evolution, and that important principles of democratic govern-
ment and national sovereignty are not left in its wake.
Daniel H. Joyner
134. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internation-
alist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999).
